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·Notice ori  the appli.cat.on of.the EC competition rules to  cross;. border ·credit transfers  ·: 
.  \  . '  .·  '  '  .  '  '  .  .  .  .  ;  '  '(  '  '  .. 
,~·. 
Introduction 
1.  . This  notice  s~ts out the  appro~ch the-Commission  intends to take when asse~sing the. 
tompatibility pf ~ross-border. credit transfers systems. with Artides 85. and  86 of the EC 
Treaty.  ·  ·  ·  ·  -' ·  ·  · 
2.··  The application of the -competitimi rules must take into account the. overall  Commission 
policy on cross-border payments. A majorpolicy objectiv~ ofthe Commissi()n is to ensure 
tha( in  the  medium term,  the  transpa~ency, performance  and' stability  of cross-border· 
payment systems equals thal of the best 'domestic systems:  The~ full benefits of the internal 
market  and  Economic and  Monetary  Union  will  only  be  achieved·. ir' it is  possible  for .. 
busitlesses  ~nd individuals to transfer money rapidly. and  reliably  from  one  part of thee 
. Union to another.  ·  ·  · · 
3.  ,  Until recently nipst cross-border credit transfers  hav~ been processed through traditional 
·correspondent banking' relations. 'In  such  arrangements  ttansfers: have  typically  lieen': 
processed and' settled individually. For small  ~alue transfers this has meant that costs have 
been ·a  large  proportion  of the  amount  transferred.  Many  banks  in  the-EU have  been 
cooperating to  develop new systems to h~ndle  cross~border credit transfers.-These systems, 
which typically use domestic clearing  syst~rhs to distribute incoining·cross.:.border 'credit 
trans(ers in the destination country, indud_e:  ' 
thos~ based on e~h~nced correspondent banking·lirtks be~eeri  institUtions in different' 
· Memb~r States;  ·  .  ·  ·.  ·.  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
those based on  cl.ubs  oLparti_cular types of  institutions; 
~ 
those .relying on  direct links. between automated clearing  house~  '(ACHs)  .. ·  .. 
·  4.  · ·Some  larger  bahks·  us~  their. own network  ~f branches  and  subsidiaries as  their 
correspondent network.  Another possibility is for a bank to seek directly to. participate In  . 
an  ACHor other-clearing sy.stems located in another· Mem~erState. 
5.  ··-The .Commi'ssiort welconies.these  efforts  t,o  improve  the ·quality  of  service, offered to 
customers.· However, Commission  ~urveys in  J 993  and  1994  showed inst,Jfficient  ov·erall· 
improvements jn the_ transparency  and  perf~rm.ance of cross·~bmder credit  transfers.~ The 
'·. /l t\. ; 
'  ,. Commission therefore adopted a proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive 
on cr:oss-border credit transfers
1
. That' proposal was accompanied by a ·draft of this notice. 
6.  This notice·aims to assist market participants by indicating the Commission's. approach in 
matters which raise competition issues. The Commission's general. approach will be to view 
positively arrangements between banks that enable them to provide improved cross-border 
credit transfer systems, and in particular that enable them to meet ·the requirements of the 
proposed Directive.  Such arrangements must however comply with Articles 85  and 86  of 
the EC treaty. Effective competition between banks and between systems has an important 
role in improving the efficiency  of services and  reducing prices to the  consumer.' This· 
notice aims to clarify which forms  of cooperation amount to undesirable collusion,  and 
thereby  clarify  the  dividing line  between  where  cooperation  1s  necessary  and  where 
'competition is possible.  ' 
7.  This notice updates and replaces the "Principles on competition for credit transfer systems" 
contained at Annex C _of the Commission Working Document of 27 March  1992
2
.- In the 
light  of further  experience  in  this  field  or  in  the  event ·of significant  changes  in  the 
conditions which prevailed  wh~n  .this notice was drawn up,  the Commission may  find  it 
appropriate to adapt this notice:  · 
l. Scope and· definitions 
8.  -In this Notice: 
. (a)  "automated clearing house (ACH)"  means an ·electronic clearing system, based 
on  a  set  of procedures,  whereby  credit  and  financial  institutions  present  an,d 
'  exchange data' and/or documents relating to cross-border credit transfers, primarily 
_ via  magnetic media  or  telecommunications  netWorks  and  handled  by  a data-
processing centre; 
(b)  "credit transfer" means a payment consisting of a series of operations -beginning 
with the originator's payment order made for the purpose of placing funds at the 
disposal  of the  beneficiary.  Both  the  payment  instructions  and  the  funds 
described  therein  move  froin  the  bank of the  originator' to  the  bank  of the 
beneficiary, possibly via several other banks as intermediaries ancilor more than 
one credit transfer system;  ··  · 
' '(c)  "cross-border credit transfer" means a credit transfer by an originator via a  bank 
or its branch in  one Member  State to a beneficiary at  a bank or its branch .in 
another Member State; 
(d)  "cross-border credit transfer  ~ystem" means ·a  system  through  which  payment. 
instructions and the funds described_ therein may ·be transmitted for the purpose _ 
of effecting cross-border credit transf~rs;- ·  · 
Communication of 18 November 1994, COM(94)436: "EU Funds Transfers: Transparency, Performance and 
. Stability"._ 
·2  SEC(92)621  "Easier cross-border payments: Breaking down the barriers". 
2 · (e)  "cross~border payment .instrument"  means  a  means· of payi:nent  (including  a 
credit transfer, a payment. card, or a  cheque) that can be used to make a cross-
border  payment.  A  cross-border  payment  can  be · face-to-face . 6r  remote;. 
depending on whether the originator and  benefici~ physically meet when the. 
· payinent is initiated;  ·  ·  · · 
(f)  "multilateral interchange fee"  ~ea.ris a collectively agreed inter~bank transaction · 
·fee·  '  ·  · 
' 
· 9.  · · This notice .applies only to crqss-border creqit transfer systems. For the purposes of this 
:.notice,  a credit' transfer· system iri  a single Member State is a  cross~border credit transfer • 
sy'stem in so far as it carri'es 'cross-border credit transfers..  . 
'  .  .  '  .  . 
'  ' 
10 ..  Articles.85 .and  86  only apply where there may be an  effecton trade. betWeen  Membe~ 
S~tes: Cross-border credittr~sfer systems; precfsely .becau~ethey carry cross.-border credit 
transfers, will be capable of having 'such an  effece~ 
· 11. ·  This notice is· addressed  to credit institutions an.d  other institutions.  ~hich participate. in , 
cross-border cre:dit  transfer systems and  execute such  transfer:s.  For the purposes of this 
··notice; such ·i'nstitutim1s are referred to as  "banks". 
2.  The market 
(l) Relevant market 
12.  In order to assess. the effects of an  agree~enton competition, for the  purpos~s of·Anicle . 
85.and whether there is a doininanf·positiori on the market for the purpose.s of Article 86; 
it is.necessary to define'the rerevant'~arket: '  '  •'  .  ' 
.  .  ,  .  I 
13.  . The  relevant  product  market  compri~~s  all  those  products· which. are  regarded  as 
. interchangeable or S'l,lbstitutable by the consumer, by reason o(the products' characteristics, 
.  their prices and their intended use. The structure of supply and d~inand on the market must . 
also be taken into account.  Th~  rel~vant geographic inarket isian area  ~here  the condhions 
of competition applying tothe relevant product are sufficiently homogenous and which can 
be 'distinguished from neighbouringareas because, in particular, conditions of  competition 
c:tre appreciably different in those areas. The Con'nnission can precisely define m~rketsonly_ · 
in individual cases. It can, however, indicate how it will approach defining the market for 
assessing cross-border  cr~dit transfer systems:  .  ' 
.  ! 
\  -} 
· 3  Case  172/80 Zuchner \'.  Bayerische Vereinsbank[1981] ECR  2021, paragraphl8. 
3 14.  For any  particular  cross-border  credit transfer  the  originator's  bank will  not  normally 
choose the beneficiary's bank. That does not however mean that there is rio  possibility of 
competition between banks for customers. Competition may  exist, to varying degrees, at 
different levels. In order to determine the relevant market in  a particular case,  it will  be 
necessary to consider the  extent  of competition  on  these  different levels.  Intra-system 
competition  will  occur  when  banks  participating  in  a  particular  system  compete  for. 
customers by  offering the best· combinations of prices and  conditions for effecting and 
receiving  cross-border credit transfers.  Inter-system  competition will  occur when  banks 
participating in different cross-border credit transfer systems compete for customers·. Intra-
instrument competition will occur when different but interchangeable types of cross-border 
credit  transfers  are  offered  by  banks,  for  example  urgent  and  non-urgent  transfers  or 
transfers  that  carry  additional  information  and  those  that.  do  not.  Inter-instrument 
competition· will  occur when  cross-border  payment instruments  other than .cross-border · 
·credit transfers. are interchangeable With  cross-border credit transfers·. 
15.  First,  the  widest  extent  of interchangeability  would  b.e  with  other remote  cross..:border 
payment instruments. While the produGt market might include payment instruments other 
than  cross-border 'credit transfers,  payment instruments that can be used to make remote 
cross-border  pay.ments  have  different  characteristics  and  end  uses  from  payment 
instruments  that  can  only  be  used  to  make  either  face-to-face  payments  or  national 
payments.  . , . 
16.  Secondly, within the category of remote cross-border payments (or within the category of 
cross-border credit transfers) there may well exist separate narrower markets. Systems used 
tO make small value (retail) payments may well not be interchangeable with those for large. 
value (wholesale) payments.  The same is true  for  payments made to retailers and  other 
providers of goods and  services as  opposed to payments made  to_  individuals,  or urgent 
payments as  o,pposed  to non-urgent payments. 
17.  thirdly, a particular_ payment instrument (or even a particular segment of the instrument) 
may  on  its  own  constitute_ a relevant  market.  For example,  in  the Helsinki  Agreement 
. decision  the  Commission  found  the  directly  relevant  market  to  be  that  of ·foreign 
Eurocheques  drawn  in  the  trading· sector  in  France
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•  It  may  well  be  appropriate  in 
individual cases to consider cross-border credit transfers (or particular segments,  such as 
retail  cross-border credit transfers) as the relevanrmarket. 
18.  In addition to a relevant market on which banks compete for customers, there will also be 
a relevant market on which different cross-border credit transfer systems, ACHs and banks 
compete to offer other banks different channels for handling cross-border credit transfers. 
For  example,  different  banks  in  a  particular  Member  State  can  compete  to  act  as  a . 
correspondent bank to banks in other Member States. The correspondent bank will deliver 
incoming cross-border credit transfers to the beneficiary's bank. Competition for banks on 
this market  c~  also be described as  inter-system competitimi. 
4  Commission  Decision  of  25  March  1992' Eurocheque:  Helsinki  Agreement  OJ  No  L  95  of 9.4.1992, · 
paragraphs 8, 76; upheld on this point by the Court of First Instance, Cases T-39/92 & T-40/92 Groupement 
des cartes bancaires "CB" and Europay lnterimtional v  ..  Commiss_ion  11994]  ECR ll-49, paragraph  104. 
4 . ,· 
.\ 
.19 .  ."The  geographic  market  appears  to be· still.  largely: national  sin.ce  the .conditions  of 
competition applying to cross-border payments differ: between the M.erfiber  States. · 
.  '  .  '  '  ~'  .  ~. 
(2) Competition on the relevant markets· ·· 
I  •  •  • 
.  .  . 
20.  . Competition between banks for customers Will  ~nly be ·effective when there is transparency  . 
of prices and conditions vis-a-~is ~tistoiners. The competition will be' more intense where 
customers have low switching costs, for example if  banks offer t6 send transfers on behalf 
of  those who do  not hold accounts at the banks in question. 
21.  . There would currently. appear to be a ·certain amount of  inter-system coni  petition for banks 
·between ciifferent cross-border credit transfer systems that deliver credit transfers from the 
originator's bank. into the country  of. the beneficiary's bank.  At the same time in· mimy  . 
Member  State·s  there  may  well  be limited  or  no  such  conipetitiorr  fC~-ced  by  domestic 
dearing systems used to distribute incoming cross-border credit transfers in. those Member 
·States.  ·  · 
._  :· 
22.  A  restriction· of int~a-::system· competition  in  a .particul~r system will  have  less  serious. 
effects  w~ere this is  compensated for  by  the wider competition of other ·systems (inter-
•  system  competition)  or  of other  instruments  or  both.  Convers'ely,  'whe~e this  wider 
· ·competition is weak or not:~-existent it  will be particularly important to ensure that potential.·. 
intra-system competition is not  restricted.  Moreover, if  si~ilar (intra-syste~) restrictions .· 
'  occur within.  competing systems, less reliance can be placed on the existence of the wider 
competition tQ  co_mpensate' for the loss of  intra-system competition.  .  ' 
3. Non-priCe competition' 
(1) Membership in a system 
23. · 'The question ofmembership in cro~s-bo~der  c~edit  tra~sfer syste'ms ha~ to take into a~count 
aspects of CommunitY law other than the competition rules.  In particular, where systems 
are  set up  by .legislation  or  guided  by  public  ~uthorities; th·e  principles of freedom.of 
establishment,  freedom to provide services. and  free movement. of capital  and  payments 
contained in the E·c Treaty and In the Second Banking Directive
5 will be applicable. Those . 
a~pects ·of public regulation are not  dealt with. in this document. 
· · 24.  .Private arrangements between banks· setting up new or linking existing cr~ss..:border credit  , 
. :t'rarisfer systems will ,have to comply with Articles 85 and  86  of the EC Tre&ty. 
.  .  .  "  .  .  .  .  . 
/ 5  Second Council Directive of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of law~. regul<itions and administrative 
provisions :relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutionS · (89/646/EEC). OJ No. 
·  L.'386,: 30.12.1989, p.  I. .  .  .  .  '  . 
5 25.  Where a cross-border credit transfer system  constitutes an  "essential facility"  it must be 
open for further membership (as  distinct from  ownership) provided that candidates 'meet 
appropriate membership criteria (see paragraph 26 below). An essential facility is a facility 
or  infrastructure  without  access  to  which  competitors  cannot  provide  services  to  their 
customers
6
:  A  cross-border  credit transfer  system  will  be  an  essential  facility. when 
participation in it  is necessary for banks to compete on the relevant market. In other words, 
. lack of access to the system amounts to a significant barrier to entry for a new competitor. 
This would be the case if a new  competitor  could  not feasibly  gain  access  to  another 
system or create its own .system in order to compete on the relevant market. 
.  •  I 
26.  A  cross-border  credit  transfer  syst~m that .  constitut~s an  essential  facility  may  apply 
membership criteria provided that these are objectively justified. Membership can take the 
form of direct or indirect participation', with membership criteria for direct members and 
indirect members differing in relation to differences in the natUre of their responsibilities. 
The membership. criteria should be written, accessible, and non-discriminatory. They may, 
for  example,  lay  down  requirements  for  members  concerning  their financial' standing,  . 
technical or management capacities, and compliance with a level of creditworthiness. The 
payment. of an  entry fee may  also be required.  An  entry fee must not,  however, be set.at 
so  high  a level  that it becomes a barrier to  entry.  In any  event, the level  of an  entry fee 
must  not  exceed  a  fair  share  of the  real. cost  of past  investments  in  the  system. The 
meinbershi'p criteria may not  ~ake  membership in the system conditional upon acceptance 
of other unrelated services·.  ·  · 
iT  A requirement of a minimum number of transactions could constitute an entry barrier for 
smaller banks.  A cross-border credit transfer system that constitutes an  essential  facility 
· should  wherever·  possible  permit  membership  of banks  with  only'  a  small  number  of 
transactions., One  acceptable  way  of  a~hieving this·  would  be·  to.  allow  the  indirect 
participation  of such  banks.  Where. indirect participation  does  not  exist,  there  must  be 
objectivelyjustified reasons for any  requirement of a minimum number of transactions. 
.  . 
28.  Refusai of membership or definitive exclusion from a cross-border credit transfer system 
that constitutes an  essential facility  should be accompanied by  a written justification for 
the reasons for the refusal  or·exclusion and  should be subject to  an  independent  revie~ 
procedure. 
·  6  On the notion of  an essential facility, see Cases 6 &  7173 Jnstitutio Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial 
Solvents Corporation v.  Commission [1974) ECR 223; Commission DeCision of 4 November 1988 London 
European- Sabena OJ  No  L 317, 24.11.1988; p.  47; Commission Decision of 11  June  1992 B&J Line v. 
Sea/ink  (1992]  CMLR  255;  Commission Decision of 21  December  1993  Port of  f!..odby  OJ  No  L  55; 
26.2.1994,  p.  52;  JGR  Stereo  Television  Eleventh  Competition  Report.  point  94;  Dlsma  Twentv-third 
Competition Report, points 223  and 224.  ·  ·  · 
· 7  Indirect participation is a form of membership ~hich  gives to institutions some functions and responsibilities 
· of direct participation without going so far as to entrust them with the settlement responsibilities which are 





,  ,·  r 
A  sy~te~ which i.s  not an  esse~ti~ facility is  not obliged to [?e. open'to f~rther member~ 
nor to have objectively justified membership  criteria.  Systems,  whetherornot they  are 
_.  essenti~l faciiities,  may be capable of  obtainl'ng an exemption under Artide 85(3) if th'ey  . 
prevent, in order to ensure adequate volume,. individual members from  taldn~ part in: other ' 
systems: 
(2) Operation of a system · 
30.  · Agreements between banks must not lead to any exclusivity arrangement: customers ~ust 
'. remain free to change banking connecticln_s from one institution to another, 'ar to bank with 
-several  institUtions simultaneously.  - ·  ·  · 
31.  Banks within  a  cross-border  credit transfer  system .  can  ~gree ;tandards relating 'to the  . 
. . operation.ofthe system, the kind and quality of transactions to be processed by the system, . 
and security_ and,risk management rules.  . 
.... ,. .  .) __  Agreements· on  operational standards,  including the following:  will normally fall  outside 
the scope of Article 85(1). .  .  .  . 
.  j' 
standardiseq message forma~sand ;outi·n.g identifiers (but agreemel)tS on eligible 
hardware  should  be  avoided  except  where  necessary  for  the  operation ·of the 
system);  · -
·_the' minimu~  information necessary for a transfer to be sent through the system; 
-·  settlemen~ arr~gem~nts, for example the modalities of how settlement-is to be  . 
achieved,  of agreeing  settlement  totals,  and  of agreeing  the  point  at. Which  . -
· - settlement can be considered final.·  -· 
33:  -·  Th~  following agreements ori standards Illight fall  ~ithin Article 85(  1  ).  Where they do so, 
· they  will  normally be capable  of ex~mption- undc;:r  Article  85(3)  when  they  are  non-
.. - discriminatory ·and limited. to what is  required to. improve the functioning ,of the  s'y~tem. 
\  \  .  .  . 
( 1)  Agreements on transaction standards, including: 
· - rules on transaction times, for example stipulating that value will be r:eceived by 
·- the beneficiary bank ofa credit transfer by a 'certain deadline if a  payment order 
· is received by a certain time (but such arrangements must, in particular~ notJead 
to concerted value dating:practi~es vis-a~vis customers);  - · 
I'  •  ~ 
maximum and ·mini~um amounts to be processed by  a  sys~em  .. 
· (2) . Agreements 'on  security and  ri~k management rules, incll}ding: 
_·  criteria for the granting of settlement. status and the ,management of settlement . 
accoun~s-; 
- arrangements relating to'liquidity standards (for example, a requirement to post 
sufficient .collateral to cover exposures); 
prearranged sharing_ of losses from  defaults of parti,cipants. 
7 34.  Agreements must be limited to inter-barik relations and must not lead to concerted practices 
vis-a-vis customers.· 
. 4.  Price competition 
(i)  Start-up costs of cross-border credit transfer systems and  operating costs of central 
bodies 
35.  The costs incurred by  the setting up  of a  ~ross-border credit transfer  system  and  those 
arising  out  of the· operation  o~ a  central  body  (for  example,  an  ACH),  can  be  shared 
amongst participating banks by means of, for example,· an ACH tariff (which might vary 
according to volumes or other pre-established conditions) charged to participating ba_nks. 
If setting up costs have been necessarily incurred by  participating banks acting in their 
capacity as beneficiaries'· banks, it might be justifiable to pay for those costs by means of 
a collectively agreed interchange fee (as to which,. see below)  . 
.  I 
(2) Pricing in cross-border credit transfer systems 
36.  A transaction in a payment system-will typically involve at least four parties: the originator 
(the customer making the payment), the originator's bank,  the  beneficiary  (the customer 
receiving  the  payment),  and  the  beneficiary's  bank.  Their  four  mutUal  relationships 
constitute the framework in  which pricing occurs within the payment system:  originator-
. originator's bank, beneficiary-beneficiary's bank, originator's bank-beneficiary's bank, and 
originator-beneficiary. The pricing arrangements on the four different relationships interact.  .  '  ;  . .  . 
37.  In respect of a cross-border credit transfer, the originator's bank and the beneficiary's bank 
may well not have dir~ct contractual relations. In that case, the transfer will be handled by 
a. chain of  banks. Each pair of banks in the chain will be linked by  a bilateral agreement 
and/or, within a system, by a multilateral agreement. Inter-bank pricing may be part of the 
relationship between· each pair of banks.  ·  · · 
(a)  Pricing between banks and customers 
38 ..  Various pricing methods are found;  sep'~rat~ly or in combination.  These include explicit 
prices,  such as transaction related fees and annual fees,  as well  as  less transparent prices 
· such· as value dating practices, lower interest on  account balances (and/or higher interest 
on loans and overdrafts) than would otherwise be the case, and less advantageous exchange · 
rates. 
39.  ·Here,  as  in  other· areas  of banking  competition,  participating  banks  must  not  make 
agreements fixing the type or level of pricing vis-a-vis customers. Legislation sometimes, 
however, limits the extent to which banks may  price vis-a-vis customers;  subject to the 
case~law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities concerning the combined 
application of Articles 5(2) and 85  of the Treaty.  · 
8 · ....  '  ,' .....  ,' 
(b) Mu.ltilateral interchange fees 
'  ,. 
·40.  The Commission considers that a  biiaterali~terchange fee agreement will normally  fall 
~utside Arti~le 85(1)~ In con,trast,  a multilateral interchange fee agieeinent is a restricti-on  •.. 
()f com  petitio~ falling  ~nd~r Article 85(1) because it  subst~tially restricts the freedo~  ·or 
banksindividually to decide theh own pricing policies. The restriction is likely also to have 
. the effect of distorting the  behaviour of banks· vis-a-vis ·thei.r  customers: There will· ~e . 
another  restriCtion 'of competition under  Alticle  85(1)  when  there is an  'agreement  or 
concerted practice between bimks to pass ·on the effect of the interchange fee in the prices·.· 
they  charge their customers.  .  ·  ·  . 
41.  · Sufficiently strong  inte~-system comp~tition could restrain the effects of the. i,n~erchange · 
fee ·on  the prices. c~arged to. customers. In such  a. situation  the restrictive  ~ffect of the 
multilateral  in~erchange fee within the one system might not be appreCiable  (and  so fall 
outsidethe scope of Article 85(1)),· provided that 'the competing systems do not themselves 
also contain similar multilateral interchange fees .. 
42.  Where there is limited or no inter-system  ~ompetition,'a multilateral interchange fee will 
. normally  be ,considered  t6  have  the  effect  of restricting  competition  to  an  appreciable 
. extent,  and thus to rill within the prohioition of Article 85(1).  . 
•,  !  .  .  ' 
43  ..  Where  agreements  on  rimltilateral  interchange fees  fall.within  Article  85(1),  it is:_only 
where they are shown~to be actu.ally necessary for the successful implementation of certain 
' forms  of cooperation,  positive in  themselves,  that they  may  be  capable of obtaining an 
exemption ·under :Article  85(3).  It  is  not  for  the  Commis.sion  to impose any  particular· 
. arrangements  on  banks.  Where,  however,  banks  introduce  multilateral  inte~:change fee 
."arrangements,  the .Commission  (in  applying  the  criteria  set  out ·in  Article  85(3)  for 
obtaining an  exemp~ori) will examine the economic benefitwhtch these arrangements seek 
·to achieve and consider whether consumers (including both those who ate customers and 
those  Y~ho are  no~)· will  receive a  fair  share  of the  benefit  ar\d~whether the·  particula~ 
interchange· fee  arrangements are· actually necessary  as  a· means to achieve that benefit. 
,  '  •  •  '  J  '  •  •'  '  ,  ,  ',  I,'·  ,  ,  ,· 
·(c) Handling cross-border credit transfers 
44 .. An example  of~ cross-border  credit transfer  being  handled  by  a  chain .of banks  is  as  · 
follows,  the originator's bal_lk  might pass the·transfer.to a  fi~st intern-iediarybarikin the 
sari1e  Men1ber  State.  The  intermediary  bank  wm take  c~re ·of the  cross~border )ink by 
passing the transfer to a second intermediary bank (a correspond~ntbank)in the destination 
. Member State. The correspondent bank will deliver the transfer- to the beneficiary's bank. • 
This  Will  typically  be  done ·through  a  domesti~ clearing  system,  .in_ which  case' the 
corresponde,nt bank acts an  entry  point into the· domestic system.  Ati ACH  can  take· the 
place of'the first'intermediary bank or the correspondent bankor both.·· ,.  · 
.. ':·.  '. 
I  .· 
'  9 45.  Inter-bank pricing may be part of the.relationship between each pair of banks in the chain. 
In: the example given, each of the first intermediary hank and the correspondent bank will  · 
normally  be  able  to  agree  bilaterally  with  resRectively  originator's  banks . and  first 
intermediary banks a price for. handling cross-porder credit transfers.  Such bilateral price 
agreements fall  outside Article 85(1).  Alternatively, if a group of banks were to .agree a 
multilateral  interchange fee  to  cover  either  of these  links  in  the  chain,  this  would ·in 
principle  fall  within  Article  85(1).  However,  the  restrictive  effect  of the  multilateral 
interchange fee might not be appreciable (and so fall  o:utside the scope of Article 85(1)), 
provided that ·there were· competing systems which did not themselves also contain similar 
multilateral interchange fees. 
'46.  The final  pair of banks in  th~ chain are the correspondent bank ~nd the beneficiary's bank. 
They might use a domestic correspondent link, but they will typically both be members of 
the domestic clearing system (or ACH) that is used to distribute the incoming transfers in 
the destination Member State. Here, inter-system competition is likely to be limited or .non-
existent,  because of, the need to use 'a  system  which can  ensure delivery  to  all  possible 
beneficiary banks in the destination country.  (There would of course be no/inter-system 
competition if  banks were to agree that only one particular system would be used to handle 
incoming  transfers.)  A  multilateral  interchange  fee  that  applies  to  cross~b6rdh credit 
transfers handled by  such a system raises competition concerns under Article 85(1).  .  .  . 
·(d) Double charging 
.47.  Double charging occurs when the ori.ginator of a cross-border transfer requests to pay  all 
·.the  charges  of the  transfer  (a  so-called  "OUR"  transfer
8
),  but  nevertheless  either  an 
intermediary bank or the beneficiary's bank makes a. deduction from the amount transferred 
or the beneficiary's bank makes a. charge to the beneficiary exceeding the charge that would 
be made for a domestic transfer;  ·  · 
48.  The  Commission  considers  that  the  po,ssibility  for  customers  to  make  OUR  transfers 
constitUtes an economic benefit for the purposes of Article 85(3). In certain circumstances, 
an agreement on a multilateral interchange fee applying to cross-border credit transfers may 
be indispensable in order to avoid the practice of double charging cross-border transfers, 
thu.s enabling banks to offer OUR transfers (see paragraph 53 ·a:nd following b~low). If  that 
.is the case, the fee will be exempted under Article 85(3). 
· 49 .. The Commission  considers  that  a multilateral  interchange fee  applying to  cross-border 
credit transfers would  not  normally  be  indispensable in; order to  enable  banks to  offer· 
SHARE  or  BEN ·cross-border  credit  transfers.  In  respect  of a  SHARE  transfer,  the 
originator's  bank  can  charge  its  customers  a price  to  cover its. own  costs,  intermediary 
banks  can  deduct  from  the  amount of the  transfer·a price  to  cover their  own 'costs (or 
charge the originator's bank for those costs), and the beneficiary's bank can charge its own 
customers a price to' cover its own costs. In respect of a BEN transfer, the originator's bank 
8  Transfers can be described as "OUR",  "SHARE"  or "BEN"  depending on how the customers  requ~st the 
charges to-be allocated: 
OUR':  all charges to originator (our charges);  . 
- SHARE:  share costs  ~etween originator and beneficiaty; 
- ··  BEN:  all charges to. the  ~eficiaty  ... 
10 
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:·.  ' 
.  .· ..  -...  .  .  :  ,- '  .  \.  .  ;  - .  .  .. 
-and intermediary bailks can deduct from the amount of the transfer  ~price'  to cover ~heir ' 
own c·ostsandthe beneficiary's bank can char~e its own CJ.,lStorners a  price to COVer its own 
costs.  ·' 
·,;  ;  ~ 
so:  Bapks should remain fr~e· individually _to decide whether to offer any .or all of OUR, BEN 
and SHARE cross-border credit transfers9.  ·  ·  ·  , 
(e)  Costs for cross-border transfers· 
51.  . To carry  out a cross-border transfer may  require .extra tasks as  compared to. a domestic  - ' 
transfer: .  - ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
(1)  In reiatiori _to ,the  system  a:s  a whole, a new system  may  need  to be set up,'  or an 
existing .system modified, to process cross-border tr~nsfers.  · 
(2}  In relation to the transfer itself, ,..extra tasks might inpiudi 
(i)  ·  a  cross-border transfer may  need to. be· reported 'to  the balanpe ·of payments 
authorities· as an iricorriing payment; ·  · 
.(ii)  . the paymenrmay neeq· to be converted into the currency of  the benefiCiary;.· 
(iii)  ~egulation may -re~uire that the beneficiary is provided  ~th. more information 
(for  examp~e, details relating to the payment order) than is normally given for 
domestic payments;  -
(iv) · the details of the beneficiary,-their account number and the bank sort cod,e rieed  . 
to be verified since this information is  often incomplete or incorrect; 
,  '  .  I 
•  '(v)' 'the payment order needs to be reformatted if it i~ l9 be pro~essed by_the ctearirig 
circuit in the destination country;  ·  ··  ·  ·  · 
'  . 
(:vi)  addition-al  clearing  ~nd settlement  ~peration~ may be needed. ' 
52.  W~enever  the originator's 'bank or a c6rre~pondent bank or ACH are able to c~rry out those 
extra  tasks',  the  transfer·  could  be  ente,red  into·  the  domestic .clearing  system'' of the  ' 
. destination country as if it:.were a domestic transfer. This  mean~ that there would  fo~ the  .. · 
beneficiary's  bank be  no  difference b_etween  receiving  a transfer that  has  originated  in  '' 
anot~er c.ountry and receiving a purely.domestic transfer. In s~ch a Situation, the  p~oblem 
. of double charging should not arise, and .a multilateral interchange r~·e related to the cross~ 
border  .nature of the transfer would not ·seem necessary..  ·  ··  · 
'< 
•'  ( 
9  ~  .The proposed Directive would make OUR tiarisfers the default solution where nothing has been specified by 




"' (/}Avoiding double charging where cross-border tranSfers give rise to specific costs 
53'.  Nevertheless,  the  Commission  recognizes that there  may_ continue to  be  circumstances 
where a beneficiary's bank will necessa~ly continue to face additional costs for the receipt 
of a cross-border transfer as compared to a domestic transfer. In particular, that will be the 
_  qase in those Mer;nber  States which require that the beneficiary's bank report an incoming 
payment to the balance of payments authorities, or which require that beneficiaries receive 
more information from their bank than is normally given for domestic payments. That will 
also  be the  case  where beneficiaries'  banks  have  incurred  the  costs. of setting up  new 
systems (and here again the position will vary  as  between the different Memb~r States). 
In such circumstances it may be justifiable for banks in the destination country to  agree 
a multilateral interchange fee,  to cover those additional  costs, in order to avoid double-
charging.  Such an interchange fee  might be agreed between participants in an  ACH,  or · 
generally between all  or most banks of a particular country. 
54.  An arrangement betWeen participants in an ACH would cover the necessary extra costs of 
beneficiary's  banks  by_ means  of an  interchange  fee  agreed. between  the  ACH  and  the 
--participating beneficiary's banks. This multilaterally agreed interchange fee would be based 
on  ~e actual  extra costs of the beneficiary's banks,  and  could be included in the overall 
(bilateral) fee charged by the ACH to sending banks (or sending ACHs). The ACH would 
remunerate beneficiary's banks for their necessary extra costs by redistributing to them the 
interchange fee.  _ 
55.  An  arrangement between all  or most banks of a particular country would again cover the 
necessary extra costs of  beneficiary's banks by means of an interchange fee agreed between_ 
all  participating-beneficiary's banks. For ~ny particular transfer, one of those banks would 
be  acting  as  the  correspondent  (entry  point)  bank  for  the  sending  bank.  Again,  any 
multilaterally  agreed  interchange  fee  would  be  based  on  the  actUal  extra  costs  of the 
beneficiary's  banks,  ·and  .could  be  included  in  the  overall  (bilateral)  fee charged  by 
correspondent banks to sending banks (or sending ACHs). The correspondent bank would 
remunerate beneficiary's banks for their necessary extra costs by redistributing to_ them the 
_interchange fee.  _,  • 
(g)  Conditions for a multilateral interchange fee 
56.  Where  a multilateral  interchange fee  falls  within  Article  85(1)  but  can  be  exempted as 
being necessary  ~~ avoid double charging, it should meet the following conditions.  · 
· ( 1)  The level of the fee  should be  set  (and  revised  regularly) at  the level of the average 
actual  additional costs of participating banks acting as  beneficiary's banks. 
.  . 
(2)  The fee  should  be  defined  as  a  default  fee;  allowing members  of the systeqt  to.· 
negotiate bilateral fees above or below the reference-leveL 
.. 
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